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Abstract
The human visual system is remarkably robust against a wide range of naturally
occurring variations and corruptions like rain or snow. In contrast, the performance
of modern image recognition models strongly degrades when evaluated on previously
unseen corruptions. Here, we demonstrate that a simple but properly tuned training
with additive Gaussian and Speckle noise generalizes surprisingly well to unseen
corruptions, easily reaching the previous state of the art on the corruption benchmark
ImageNet-C (with ResNet50) and on MNIST-C. We build on top of these strong
baseline results and show that an adversarial training of the recognition model
against uncorrelated worst-case noise distributions leads to an additional increase in
performance. This regularization can be combined with previously proposed defense
methods for further improvement.
1 Introduction
While Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have surpassed the functional performance of humans
in a range of complex cognitive tasks [He et al., 2016, Xiong et al., 2016, Silver et al., 2017,
Campbell et al., 2002, OpenAI, 2018], they still lag behind humans in numerous other
aspects. One fundamental shortcoming of machines is their lack of robustness against
input perturbations. Even minimal perturbations that are hardly noticeable for humans
can derail the predictions of high-performance neural networks.
For the purpose of this paper, we distinguish between two types of input perturbations.
One type are minimal image-dependent perturbations specifically designed to fool a neural
network with the smallest possible change to the input. These so-called adversarial
perturbations have been the subject of hundreds of papers in the past five years, see
e.g. [Szegedy et al., 2013, Madry et al., 2018, Schott et al., 2019, Gilmer et al., 2018].
Another, much less studied type are common corruptions. These perturbations occur
naturally in many applications and include simple Gaussian or Salt and Pepper noise;
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natural variations like rain, snow or fog; and compression artifacts such as those caused
by JPEG encoding. All of these corruptions do not change the semantic content of
the input, and thus, machine learning models should not change their decision-making
behavior in their presence. Nonetheless, high-performance neural networks like ResNet50
[He et al., 2016] are easily confused by small local deformations [Geirhos et al., 2018].
The juxtaposition of adversarial examples and common corruptions was also explored in
[Ford et al., 2019] where the authors discuss the relationship between both and encourage
researchers working in the field of adversarial robustness to cross-evaluate the robustness
of their models towards common corruptions.
We argue that in many practical applications robustness to common corruptions is
often more relevant than robustness to artificially designed adversarial perturbations.
Autonomous cars should not change their behavior in the face of unusual weather conditions
such as hail or sand storms or small pixel defects in their sensors. Not-Safe-For-Work
filters should not fail on images with unusual compression artifacts. Likewise, speech
recognition algorithms should perform well regardless of the background music or sounds.
Besides its practical relevance, robustness to common corruptions is also an excellent
target in its own right for researchers in the field of adversarial robustness and domain
adaptation. Common corruptions can be seen as distributional shifts or as a weak form of
adversarial examples that live in a smaller, constrained subspace.
Despite their importance, common corruptions have received relatively little attention
so far. Only recently a modification of the ImageNet dataset [Russakovsky et al., 2014] to
benchmark model robustness against common corruptions and perturbations has been
published [Hendrycks and Dietterich, 2019] and is referred to as ImageNet-C. Now, this
scheme has also been applied to other common datasets resulting in Pascal-C, Coco-C
and Cityscapes-C [Michaelis et al., 2019] and MNIST-C [Mu and Gilmer, 2019].
Our contributions are as follows:
• We demonstrate that data augmentation with Gaussian or Speckle noise serves as
a simple yet very strong baseline that is sufficient to surpass almost all previously
proposed defenses against common corruptions on ImageNet-C for ResNet50. We
further show that the magnitude of the additive noise is a crucial hyper-parameter
to reach optimal robustness.
• Motivated by our strong results with baseline noise augmentations, we introduce a
neural network-based adversarial noise generator that can learn arbitrary uncor-
related noise distributions that maximally fool a given recognition network when
added to their inputs. We denote the resulting noise patterns as adversarial noise.
• We design and validate a constrained Adversarial Noise Training (ANT) scheme
through which the recognition network learns to become robust against adversarial
noise. We demonstrate that our ANT reaches state-of-the-art robustness on the
corruption benchmark ImageNet-C for the commonly used ResNet50 architecture and
on MNIST-C, even surpassing the already strong baseline noise augmentations. This
result is not due to overfitting on the Noise categories of the respective benchmarks
since we find equivalent results on the non-noise corruptions as well.
• We modify the adversarial noise generator to allow it to produce locally correlated
noise thereby enabling it to learn more diverse noise distributions. Performing ANT
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Figure 1. Outline of our approach. A: First, we train a generative network against a
vanilla trained classifier to find the adversarial noise. B: To achieve robustness against
adversarial noise, we train the classifier and the noise generator jointly. C: We measure
the robustness against common corruptions for a vanilla, adversarially trained (Adv.
Tr.), trained on Stylized ImageNet (SIN), trained via Gaussian data augmentation
(GNT) and trained with the means of Adversarial Noise Training (ANT). With our
methods, we achieve the highest accuracy on common corruptions, both on all and
non-Noise categories.
with the modified noise generator, we observe an increase in robustness for the ‘snow’
corruption which is visually similar to our learned noise.
• We demonstrate a further increase in robustness when combining ANT with previous
defense methods.
• We substantiate the claim that increased robustness against regular or universal
adversarial perturbations does not imply increased robustness against common
corruptions. This is not necessarily true vice-versa: Our noise trained recognition
network has high accuracy on ImageNet-C and also slightly improved accuracy on
adversarial attacks on clean ImageNet compared to a vanilla trained ResNet50.
We released our trained model weights along with evaluation code on github.com/bethgelab/game-
of-noise.
2 Related work
Robustness against common corruptions Several recent publications study the
vulnerability of DNNs to common corruptions. Dodge and Karam [2016] find that state-
of-the-art image recognition networks are particularly vulnerable to blur and Gaussian
3
noise. Two recent studies compare humans and DNNs on recognizing corrupted images,
showing that DNN performance drops much faster than human performance for increased
perturbation sizes [Dodge and Karam, 2017a, Geirhos et al., 2018]. Yin et al. [2020]
study the Fourier properties of common corruptions and link them to the robustness of
differently trained classifiers.
Hendrycks and Dietterich [2019] introduce corrupted versions of standard datasets
denoted as ImageNet-C, Tiny ImageNet-C and CIFAR10-C as standardized benchmarks
for machine learning models and show that while state-of-the-art networks like ResNet50
are more accurate than outdated ones like AlexNet, their robustness is still negligible
compared to humans. Similarly, common corruptions have been applied to and evaluated
on COCO-C, Pascal-C, Cityscapes-C [Michaelis et al., 2019] and MNIST-C [Mu and
Gilmer, 2019].
There have been attempts to increase robustness against common corruptions. Zhang
[2019] integrate an anti-aliasing module from the signal processing domain in the ResNet50
architecture to restore the shift-equivariance which can get lost in deep CNNs. This results
both in increased accuracy on clean data and increased generalization to corrupted image
samples. Concurrent work to ours demonstrates that having more training data [Xie et al.,
2019a, Mahajan et al., 2018] or using stronger backbones [Xie et al., 2019a, Michaelis
et al., 2019] can significantly improve model performance on common corruptions.
A popular method to decrease overfitting and help the network generalize better to
unseen data is to augment the training dataset by applying a set of (randomized) manipu-
lations to the images [Mikołajczyk and Grochowski, 2018]. Furthermore, augmentation
methods have also been applied to make the models more robust against image corruptions
[Geirhos et al., 2019]. Geirhos et al. [2018] train ImageNet classifiers against a fixed set of
corruptions but find no generalized robustness against unseen corruptions. However, they
considered vastly higher noise severities than us. A similar observation is made by [Dodge
and Karam, 2017b]. In a follow-up study, Geirhos et al. [2019] show that recognition
models are biased towards texture and suggest this bias as one source of susceptibility
for corruptions. They demonstrate that an increased shape bias also leads to increased
accuracy on corrupted images. Hendrycks et al. [2020] is concurrent work to ours where
the authors propose a data augmentation strategy which relies on combining and mixing
augmentation chains. They also report strong robustness increases on ImageNet-C.
Augmentation with Gaussian noise has been used as a regularizer for smoothing the
decision boundary of the classifier and was shown to be a provable adversarial defense
[Cohen et al., 2019]. Conceptually, Ford et al. [2019] is the closest study to our work, since
they also apply Gaussian noise to images to increase corruption robustness. They observe
a low relative improvement in accuracy on corrupted images whereas we were able to
outperform almost all previous baselines on the commonly used ResNet50 architecture.1
They use a different architecture (InceptionV3 versus our ResNet50) and train a new model
from scratch whereas we fine-tune a pretrained model. Another methodological difference
is that we split every batch evenly in clean data and data augmented by Gaussian noise
whereas they sample the standard deviation uniformly between 0 and one specific value
and add noise to each image. Lopes et al. [2019] restrict the Gaussian noise to small image
patches which improves accuracy but does not yield state-of-the-art performance on the
1To compare with Ford et al. [2019], we evaluate our approach for an InceptionV3 architecture, see
our results in Appendix H.
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ResNet50 architecture.
An alternative approach to data augmentation relies on stability training and shows
robustness towards a range of distortions [Laermann et al., 2019].
Link between adversarial robustness and common corruptions There is cur-
rently no agreement on whether adversarial training increases robustness against common
corruptions in the literature. Hendrycks and Dietterich [2019] report a robustness increase
on common corruptions due to adversarial logit pairing on Tiny ImageNet-C. Ford et al.
[2019] suggest a link between adversarial robustness and robustness against common
corruptions, claim that increasing one robustness type should simultaneously increase
the other, but report mixed results on MNIST and CIFAR10-C. Additionally, they also
observe large drops in accuracy for adversarially trained networks and networks trained
with Gaussian data augmentation compared to a vanilla classifier on certain corruptions.
They do not evaluate adversarially robust classifiers on ImageNet. Fawzi et al. [2016] show
that curvature constraints can both improve robustness against adversarial and random
perturbations but they only present results on vanilla networks. On the other hand,
Engstrom et al. [2019] report that increasing robustness against adversarial `∞ attacks
does not increase robustness against translations and rotations, but they do not present
results on noise. Kang et al. [2019] study robustness transfer between models trained
against `1, `2, `∞ adversaries / elastic deformations and JPEG artifacts. They observe
that adversarial training increases robustness against elastic and JPEG corruptions on
a 100-class subset of ImageNet. This result contradicts our findings on full ImageNet
as we see a slight decline in accuracy on those two classes for the adversarially trained
model from [Xie et al., 2019b] and severe drops in accuracy on other corruptions. Jordan
et al. [2019] show that adversarial robustness does not transfer easily between attack
classes. Tramèr and Boneh [2019] also argue in favor of a trade-off between different
robustness types. For a simple and natural classification task, they prove that adversarial
robustness towards l∞ perturbations does neither transfer to l1 nor to input rotations
and translations, and vice versa. They support their formal analysis with experiments on
MNIST and CIFAR10.
Universal adversarial perturbations Universal adversarial perturbations (UAPs)
[Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017] are perturbations which, if added to any image, fool a
given recognition model. This contrasts with regular adversarial perturbations, which
need to be designed specifically for every single image. Hayes and Danezis [2017] generate
UAPs by training so-called universal adversarial networks (UANs). They also train the
classifier jointly with the UAN but manage to only slightly increase robustness against
UAPs. Other defenses against UAPs are similarly based on adversarial training [Metzen,
2018, Shafahi et al., 2018, Mummadi et al., 2019, Pérolat et al., 2018].
UAPs are very different from our adversarial noise setting in that UAPs can learn
perturbations with global, image-wide features while our adversarial noise is identically
distributed over pixels and thus inherently local.
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3 Methods
Our method section can be roughly split into two parts. In the first part, we revisit
Gaussian data augmentation as a method to increase robustness against image corruptions.
The second part contains two items (Fig. 1). First, we devise and train a generator neural
network to produce spatially uncorrelated noise that is adversarial to a given recognition
network (section 3.2.1 and Fig. 1A). Second, we formulate a constrained adversarial
training scheme, which allows us to train the recognition model jointly with the noise
generator (section 3.2.2 and Fig. 1B) that we call Adversarial Noise Training (ANT).
Finally, in section 3.4 we explain our evaluation methods on corrupted images (Fig. 1C).
3.1 Training with Gaussian noise
As discussed in section 2, several researchers have tried using Gaussian noise as a method
to increase robustness towards common corruptions with mixed results. In this work, we
revisit the approach of Gaussian data augmentation and increase its efficacy. In contrast to
previous work, we treat the standard deviation σ of the distribution as a hyper-parameter
of the training and measure its influence on robustness.
To formally introduce the objective, letD be the data distribution over input pairs (x, y)
with x ∈ RN and y ∈ {1, ..., k}. We train a differentiable classifier fθ(x) by minimizing
the risk on a dataset with additive Gaussian noise
E
x,y∼D
E
δ∼N (0,σ21)
[LCE (fθ(clip((x+ δ)), y)] , (1)
where σ is the standard deviation of the Gaussian noise and x+ δ is clipped to the input
range [0, 1]N . The standard deviation is either kept fixed or is chosen uniformly from
a fixed set of standard deviations. In both cases, the possible standard deviations are
chosen from a small set of nine values inspired by the noise variance in the ImageNet-C
dataset (cf. section 3.4). To maintain high accuracy on clean data, we only perturb 50%
of the training data with Gaussian noise within each batch.
3.2 Adversarial noise
3.2.1 Learning Adversarial Noise
Our goal is to find a noise distribution pφ(δ), δ ∈ RN such that noise samples added to x
maximally confuse the classifier fθ. More concisely, we optimize
max
φ
E
x,y∼D
E
δ∼pφ(δ)
[LCE (fθ(clip(x+ δ)), y)] , (2)
where clip is an operator that clips all values to the valid interval (i.e. clip(x+δ) ∈ [0, 1]N )
and ||δ||2 = . 2
We do not have to explicitly model the probability density function pφ(δ) since
optimizing Eq. (2) only involves samples drawn from pφ(δ). We model the samples from
2We apply the method derived in Rauber and Bethge [2020] and rescale the perturbation by a factor
γ to obtain the desired `2 norm; despite the clipping, the squared `2 norm is a piece-wise linear function
of γ2 that can be inverted to find the correct scaling factor γ.
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pφ(δ) as the output of a neural network gφ : RN → RN which gets its input from a normal
distribution δ = gφ(z) where z ∼ N (0,1). We enforce the independence property of
pφ(δ) =
∏
n pφ(δn) by constraining the network architecture of the noise generator gφ
to only consist of convolutions with 1x1 kernels. Lastly, the projection onto a sphere
||δ||2 =  is achieved by scaling the generator output with a scalar while clipping x+ δ to
the valid range [0, 1]N . This fixed size projection (hyper-parameter) is motivated by the
fact that Gaussian noise training with a single, fixed σ achieved the highest accuracy. 3
The noise generator gφ has four 1x1 convolutional layers with ReLU activations and
one residual connection from input to output. The convolutional weights are initialized
such that the noise generator outputs a Gaussian distribution.
3.2.2 Adversarial Noise Training
To increase robustness, we now train the classifier fθ to minimize the risk under adversarial
noise distributions jointly with the noise generator
min
θ
max
φ
E
x,y∼D
E
δ∼pφ(δ)
[LCE (fθ(clip(x+ δ)), y)] , (3)
where again x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]N and ||δ||2 = . For a joint adversarial training, we alternate
between an outer loop of classifier update steps and an inner loop of generator update steps.
This is also depicted schematically in Fig. 1B. Note that in regular adversarial training, e.g.
[Madry et al., 2018], δ is optimized directly whereas we optimize a constrained distribution
over δ.
To maintain high classification accuracy on clean samples, we sample every mini-batch
so that they contain 50% clean data and perturb the rest. The current state of the noise
generator is used to perturb 30% of this data and the remaining 20% are augmented with
samples chosen randomly from previous distributions. For this, the noise generator states
are saved at regular intervals. The latter method is inspired by experience replay from
reinforcement learning [Mnih et al., 2015] and is used to keep the classifier from forgetting
previous adversarial noise patterns.
To prevent the noise generator from being stuck in a local minimum, we halt the
Adversarial Noise Training (ANT) at regular intervals and train a new noise generator
from scratch. This noise generator is trained against the current state of the classifier to
find a current optimum. The new noise generator replaces the former noise generator in
the ANT. This technique has proven crucial to train a robust classifier.
Learning locally correlated adversarial noise We modify the architecture of the
noise generator defined in Eq. 2 to allow for local spatial correlations and thereby
enable the generator to learn more diverse distributions. Since we seek to increase model
robustness towards image corruptions such as rain or snow that produce locally correlated
patterns, it is natural to include local patterns in the manifold of learnable distributions.
We replace the 1x1 kernels in one network layer with 3x3 kernels limiting the maximum
correlation length of the output noise sample to 3x3 pixels. We indicate the correlation
length of noise generator used for the constrained adversarial noise training as ANT1x1 or
ANT3x3.
3We also experimented with an adaptive sphere radius  which grows with the classifier’s accuracy.
However, we did not see any improvements and followed Occam’s razor.
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3.3 Combining Adversarial Noise Training with stylization
As demonstrated by Geirhos et al. [2019], using random stylization as data augmentation
increases the accuracy on ImageNet-C. The robustness gains are attributed to a stronger
shape bias of the classifier. We combine our ANT and the stylization approach to achieve
robustness gains from both. To incorporate stylized data into the training scheme described
in the previous section, we change the way we sample every mini-batch: we split the
batches into clean data (25%), stylized data (30%) and data perturbed by the noise
generator (45%). Like before, we choose the latter samples with roughly equal probability
from the current state of the noise generator and from any previous distribution.
3.4 Evaluation on corrupted images
Evaluation of noise robustness We evaluate the robustness of a model by sampling a
Gaussian noise vector δ. We then do a line search along the direction δ starting from the
original image x until it is misclassified. We denote the resulting minimal perturbation as
δmin. The robustness of a model is then denoted by the median4 over the test set
∗ = median
x,y∼D
||δmin||2, (4)
with fθ(x+ δmin) 6= y and x+ δmin ∈ [0, 1]N .
Note that a higher ∗ denotes a more robust classifier. To test the robustness against
adversarial noise, we train a new noise generator at the end of the Adversarial Noise
Training until convergence and evaluate it according to Eq. (4).
ImageNet-C The ImageNet-C benchmark5 [Hendrycks and Dietterich, 2019] is a con-
glomerate of 15 diverse corruption types that were applied to the validation set of ImageNet.
The corruptions are organized into four main categories: Noise, Blur, Weather, and Digital
and have five levels of severities to reflect the varying intensities of common corruptions.
The MNIST-C benchmark is created similarly to ImageNet-C [Mu and Gilmer, 2019] with
a slightly different set of corruptions. Our main evaluation metric for both benchmarks
is the Top-1 accuracy on corrupted images for each Noise category averaged over the
severities; we also report the Top-5 accuracy on ImageNet-C. Since some works report the
‘mean Corruption Error’ (mCE) instead of accuracy, we also include results on mCE in
Appendix D.
We evaluate all proposed methods for ImageNet-C on the ResNet50 architecture for
better comparability to previous methods, e.g. [Geirhos et al., 2019, Lopes et al., 2019,
Zhang, 2019]. The clean ImageNet accuracy of the used architecture highly influences the
results and could be seen as an upper bound for the accuracy on ImageNet-C. Note that
our approach is independent of the used architecture and could in principle be applied to
any differentiable network.
4Samples for which no `2-distance allows us to manipulate the classifier’s decision contribute a value
of ∞ to the median.
5For the evaluation, we use the JPEG compressed images from github.com/hendrycks/robustness as is
advised by the authors to ensure reproducibility. We note that Ford et al. [2019] report a decrease in
performance when the compressed JPEG files are used as opposed to applying the corruptions directly in
memory without compression artifacts.
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4 Results
For our experiments on ImageNet, we use a classifier that was pretrained on ImageNet.
For the experiments on MNIST, we use the architecture from [Madry et al., 2018] for
comparability. We use PyTorch [Paszke et al., 2017] for all of our experiments. All
technical details, hyper-parameters and the architecture of the noise generator can be
found in Appendix A-B.
4.1 (In-)Effectiveness of regular adversarial training to increase
robustness towards common corruptions
As our first experiment, we evaluate whether robustness against regular adversarial
examples generalizes to robustness against common corruptions. We display the Top-
1 accuracy of vanilla and adversarially trained models in Table 1; detailed results on
individual corruptions can be found in Appendix C. For all tested models, we find that
regular `∞ adversarial training can strongly decrease the robustness towards common
corruptions, especially for the corruption types Fog and Contrast. Universal adversarial
training [Shafahi et al., 2018], on the other hand, leads to severe drops on some corruptions
but the overall accuracy on ImageNet-C is slightly increased relative to the vanilla baseline
model (AlexNet). Nonetheless, the absolute ImageNet-C accuracy of 22.2% is still very low.
These results disagree with two previous studies which reported that (1) adversarial logit
pairing6 (ALP) increases robustness against common corruptions on Tiny ImageNet-C
[Hendrycks and Dietterich, 2019], and that (2) adversarial training can increase robustness
on the CIFAR10-C data set [Ford et al., 2019].
We evaluate adversarially trained models on MNIST-C and present the results and
their discussion in Appendix E. The results on MNIST-C show the same tendency as on
ImageNet-C: adversarially trained models have lower accuracy on MNIST-C and thus
indicate that adversarial robustness does not transfer to robustness against common
corruptions. This corroborates the results of [Ford et al., 2019] on MNIST who also found
that an adversarially robust model had decreased robustness towards a set of common
corruptions.
model IN-C IN-C w/o Noises
Vanilla RN50 39.2% 42.3%
Adv. Training [Shafahi et al., 2019] 29.1% 32.0%
Vanilla RN152 45.0% 47.9%
Adv. Training [Xie et al., 2019b] 35.0% 35.9%
Vanilla AlexNet 21.1% 23.9%
Universal Adv. Training [Shafahi et al., 2018] 22.2% 23.1%
Table 1: Top-1 accuracy on ImageNet-C and ImageNet-C without the Noise categories
(higher is better). Regular adversarial training decreases robustness towards common
corruptions; universal adversarial training seems to slightly increase it.
6Note that ALP was later found to not increase adversarial robustness [Engstrom et al., 2018].
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4.2 Effectiveness of Gaussian data augmentation to increase ro-
bustness towards common corruptions
We fine-tune a pretrained image classifier with Gaussian data augmentation from the
distribution N (0, σ21) and vary σ. We try two different settings: in one we choose a single
noise level σ while in the second we sample σ uniformly from a set of multiple possible
values. The Top-1 accuracy of the fine-tuned models on ImageNet-C and a comparison
to a vanilla trained model is shown in Fig. 2. Each black point shows the performance
of one model fine-tuned with one specific σ; the vanilla trained model is marked by the
point at σ = 0. The horizontal lines indicate that the model is fine-tuned with Gaussian
noise where σ is sampled from a set for each image. For example, for the dark green line,
as indicated by the stars, we sample σ from the set {0.08, 0.12, 0.18, 0.26, 0.38}, which
corresponds to the Gaussian corruption of ImageNet-C. We show both the results on the
full ImageNet-C evaluation set and the results on ImageNet-C without Noises (namely
Blur, Weather and Digital) since Gaussian noise is part of the test set. To give a feeling
of how the different σ-levels manifest themselves in an image, we include example images
for all σ-levels in Appendix G.
There are three important results evident from Fig. 2:
1. Gaussian noise generalizes well to the non-noise corruptions of the ImageNet-C
evaluation dataset and is a powerful baseline. This is a surprising result as it was
shown in several recent works that training on Gaussian or uniform noise does not
generalize to other corruption types [Geirhos et al., 2018, Lopes et al., 2019] or that
the effect is very weak [Ford et al., 2019].
2. The standard deviation σ is a crucial hyper-parameter and has an optimal value of
about σ = 0.5 for ResNet50.
3. If σ is chosen well, using a single σ is enough, sampling from a set of σ values is not
necessary and even detrimental for robustness against non-noise corruptions.
In the following Results sections, we will compare Gaussian data augmentation to our
Adversarial Noise Training approach and baselines from the literature. For this, we will
use the models with the overall best-performance: The model GN0.5 that was trained with
Gaussian data augmentation with a single σ = 0.5 and the model GNmult where σ was
sampled from the set {0.08, 0.12, 0.18, 0.26, 0.38}.
4.3 Evaluation of the severity of adversarial noise as an attack
In this section, we try to answer the question: Can we learn the most severe uncorrelated
additive noise distribution for a classifier?
Following the success of simple uncorrelated Gaussian noise data augmentation (sec-
tion 4.2) and the ineffectiveness of regular adversarial training (section 4.1) which allows
for highly correlated patterns, we restrict our learned noise distribution to be sampled
independently for each pixel. We denote this learned adversarial noise distribution pφ(δ)
as adversarial noise (AN, section 3.2.1).
To measure the effectiveness of our adversarial noise, we report the median perturbation
size ∗ that is necessary for a misclassification for each image in the test set.
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Figure 2. Top-1 accuracy on ImageNet-C (left) and ImageNet-C without the noise
corruptions (right) of a ResNet50 architecture fine-tuned with Gaussian data augmen-
tation of varying standard deviation σ. We train on Gaussian noise sampled from a
distribution with a single σ (black dots) and on distributions where σ is sampled from
different sets (green lines with stars). We also compare to a vanilla trained model at
σ = 0.
In Table 2, we see that our AN is much more effective at fooling the classifier compared
to Gaussian and uniform noise. This is also reflected qualitatively in the noisy images in
Fig. 1 where we show images at the decision boundary: The amount of noise to fool the
classifier is smaller in the right-most image produced by the generative network than in
the central images (Gaussian and uniform noise).
model ∗GN ∗UN ∗AN
Vanilla RN50 39.0 39.1 16.2
Table 2: Median `2 perturbation size ∗ that is required to misclassify an image for Gaussian
(GN), uniform (UN) and adversarial noise (AN). A lower ∗ indicates a more severe noise,
since on average, a smaller perturbation size is sufficient to fool a classifier.
4.4 Evaluation of Adversarial Noise Training as a defense
In the previous section, we established a method for learning the most adversarial noise
distribution for a classifier. Now, we utilize it for a joint Adversarial Noise Training
(ANT1x1) where we simultaneously train the noise generator and classifier (see section
3.2.2). This leads to substantially increased robustness against Gaussian, uniform and
adversarial noise, see Table 3.
The robustness of models that were trained via Gaussian data augmentation also
increases, but on average much less compared to the model trained with ANT1x1. To
evaluate the robustness against adversarial noise, we train four noise generators from
scratch with different random seeds and measure ∗AN1x1. We report the mean value and
the standard deviation over the four runs.
To better understand this effect, we visualize the temporal evolution of the probability
density function pφ(δn) of uncorrelated noise during ANT1x1 and samples of correlated
11
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Figure 3. Example images for different perturbation sizes ∗ for additive Gaussian
noise on ImageNet.
noise during ANT3x3 in Fig. 4. This shows that the generator converges to different
distributions during ANT. Therefore, the classifier has been trained against a rich variety
of distributions.
For ANT1x1, we have also tested how the classifier’s performance changes if it is trained
against adversarial noise sampled randomly from pφ(δn). The accuracy on ImageNet-
C decreases slightly compared to regular ANT1x1: 51.1%/ 71.9% (Top-1/ Top-5) on
full ImageNet-C and 47.3%/ 68.3% (Top-1/ Top-5) on ImageNet-C without the Noise
categories.
model clean acc. ∗GN ∗UN ∗AN1x1
Vanilla RN50 76.1% 39.0 39.1 15.7 ± 0.6
GNTσ0.5 75.9% 74.8 74.9 31.8 ± 3.9
ANT1x1 76.0% 136.7 137.0 95.4 ± 5.7
Table 3: Accuracy on clean data and robustness of differently trained models as measured
by the median perturbation size ∗. A higher ∗ indicates a more robust model. To provide
an intuition for the perturbation sizes indicated by ∗, we show example images for Gaussian
noise below in Fig. 3 and a larger Figure for different noise types in Appendix I.
4.5 Comparison of different methods to increase robustness to-
wards common corruptions
We now revisit common corruptions on ImageNet-C and compare the robustness of
differently trained models. Since Gaussian noise is part of ImageNet-C, we train another
baseline model with data augmentation using the Speckle noise corruption from the
ImageNet-C holdout set. We later denote the cases where the corruptions present during
training are part of the test set by putting corresponding accuracy values in brackets.
The Top-1 accuracies on the full ImageNet-C dataset and ImageNet-C without the
Noise corruptions are displayed in Table 4; detailed results on individual corruptions
in terms of accuracy and mCE are shown in Tables 3 and 4, Appendix D. We also
calculate the accuracy on corruptions without the Noise category as our approaches to
add Gaussian noise or to perform ANT1x1 overfits to the Noise categories. By allowing the
noise generator to learn local correlations, we lift the independence constraint and argue
that the learned noise distributions are now different enough to not cause overfitting to
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Figure 4. A: Examples of learned probability densities over the grayscale version of
the noise δn during ANT1x1 where each density corresponds to one local minimum;
B: Example images with sampled uncorrelated adversarial noise; C: Example patches
of locally correlated noise with a size of 28x28 pixels learned during ANT3x3; D:
Example images with sampled correlated adversarial noise.
the Noise categories (see Fig. 4C+D). For this reason, we do not put the accuracy values
of the classifier obtained via ANT3x3 in brackets.
Additionally, we compare our results with several baseline models from the literature.
The ImageNet-C benchmark has been published recently and we use all baselines we could
find for a ResNet50 architecture:
1. Shift Inv: The model is modified to enhance shift-equivariance using anti-aliasing
[Zhang, 2019].7
2. Patch GN: The model was trained on Gaussian patches [Lopes et al., 2019]. Since
no model weights are released, we can only include their Top-1 ImageNet-C accuracy
values from their paper (and not the Top-5).
3. SIN+IN: The model was trained on a stylized version of ImageNet [Geirhos et al.,
2019].8
4. AugMix: Hendrycks et al. [2020] trained their model using diverse augmentations.9
They use image augmentations from AutoAugment [Cubuk et al., 2018] and exclude
the contrast, color, brightness, sharpness, and Cutout operations to make sure
that the test set of ImageNet-C is disjoint from the training set. We would like to
highlight the difficulty in clearly distinguishing between the augmentations used
during training and testing as there might be a certain overlap. This can be seen by
the visual similarity between the Posterize operation and the JPEG corruption (see
Appendix J).
The results on full ImageNet-C are striking (see Table 4): a very simple baseline,
namely a model trained with Speckle noise data augmentation, beats almost all previous
baselines reaching an accuracy of 46.4% which is larger than the accuracy of SIN+IN
7Weights were taken from github.com/adobe/antialiased-cnns.
8Weights were taken from github.com/rgeirhos/texture-vs-shape.
9Weights were taken from github.com/google-research/augmix.
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IN IN-C IN-C w/o Noises
clean acc. Top-1 Top-5 Top-1 Top-5
model [%] [%] [%] [%] [%]
Vanilla RN50 76.1 39.2 59.3 42.3 63.2
Shift Inv [Zhang, 2019] 77.0 41.4 61.8 44.2 65.1
Patch GN [Lopes et al., 2019] 76.0 (43.6) (n.a.) 43.7 n.a.
SIN+IN [Geirhos et al., 2019] 74.6 45.2 66.6 46.6 68.2
AugMix [Hendrycks et al., 2020] 77.5 48.3 69.2 50.4 71.8
GNTmult 76.1 (49.2) (70.2) 45.2 66.2
GNTσ0.5 75.9 (49.4) (70.6) 47.1 68.3
ANT1x1 76.0 (51.1) (72.2) 47.7 68.8
ANT1x1+SIN 74.9 (52.2) (73.6) 49.2 70.6
ANT1x1 w/o EP 75.7 (48.9) (70.2) 46.5 67.7
ANT3x3 76.1 50.4 71.5 47.0 68.1
ANT3x3+SIN 74.1 52.6 74.4 50.6 72.5
Table 4: Average accuracy on clean data, average Top-1 and Top-5 accuracies on ImageNet-
C and ImageNet-C without the Noise categories (higher is better). We compare the results
obtained by the means of Gaussian (GNT) and Speckle noise data augmentation and with
Adversarial Noise Training (ANT) to several baselines. Gray numbers in brackets indicate
scenarios where a corruption from the test set was used during training.
(45.2%) and close to AugMix (48.3%). The GNσ0.5 surpasses SIN+IN not only on the
Noise categories but also on almost all other corruptions, see a more detailed breakdown in
Table 9, Appendix D. The ANT3x3+SIN model produces the best results on ImageNet-C
both with and without Noises. Thus, it is slightly superior to Gaussian data augmentation
and pure ANT3x3. Comparing ANT1x1 and ANT3x3, we observe that ANT3x3 performs
better than ANT1x1 in the ‘snow’ corruption. We attribute this to the successful modeling
capabilities of locally correlated patterns resembling snow of the 3x3 noise generator.
We perform an ablation study to investigate the necessity of experience replay and note
that we lose roughly 2% without it (ANT1x1 w/o EP vs ANT1x1). We also test how the
classifier’s performance changes if it is trained against adversarial noise sampled randomly
from pφ(δn). The accuracy on ImageNet-C decreases slightly compared to regular ANT1x1:
51.1%/ 71.9% (Top-1/ Top-5) on full ImageNet-C and 47.3%/ 68.3% (Top-1/ Top-5) on
ImageNet-C without the noise category. We include additional results for ANT1x1 with a
DenseNet121 architecture ? and for varying parameter counts of the noise generator in
Appendix K.
For MNIST, we train a model with Gaussian data augmentation and via ANT1x1. We
achieve similar results with both approaches and report a new state-of-the-art accuracy
on MNIST-C: 92.4%. The results on MNIST-C can be found in Appendix E.
14
4.6 Robustness towards adversarial perturbations
As regular adversarial training can decrease the accuracy on common corruptions, it is
also interesting to check what happens vice-versa: How does a model which is robust on
common corruptions behave under adversarial attacks?
Both our ANT1x1 and GNT models have slightly increased `2 and `∞ robustness scores
compared to a vanilla trained model, see Table 5. We tested this using the white-box
attacks PGD Madry et al. [2017] and DDN Rony et al. [2019]. Expectedly, an adversarially
trained model has higher adversarial robustness compared to ANT1x1 or GNT. In this
experiment, we only verify that we do not unintentionally reduce adversarial robustness
compared to a vanilla ResNet50. For details, see Appendix E for MNIST and Appendix F
for ImageNet.
model clean acc. [%] `2 acc. [%] `∞ acc. [%]
Vanilla RN50 75.2 41.1 18.1
GNTσ0.5 75.3 49.0 28.1
ANT1x1 75.7 50.1 28.6
Adv. Training Shafahi et al. [2019] 60.5 58.1 58.5
Table 5: Adversarial robustness on `2 ( = 0.12) and `∞ ( = 0.001) compared to a Vanilla
ResNet50.
5 Discussion & Conclusion
So far, attempts to use simple noise augmentations for general robustness against common
corruptions have produced mixed results, ranging from no generalization from one noise to
other noise types [Geirhos et al., 2018] to only marginal robustness increases [Ford et al.,
2019, Lopes et al., 2019]. In this work, we demonstrate that carefully tuned additive noise
patterns in conjunction with training on clean samples can surpass almost all current
state-of-the-art defense methods against common corruptions. By drawing inspiration
from adversarial training and experience replay, we additionally show that training against
simple uncorrelated worst-case noise patterns outperforms our already strong baseline
defense, with additional gains to be made in combination with previous defense methods
like stylization training [Geirhos et al., 2019].
There are still a few corruption types (e.g. Motion or Zoom blurs) on which our
method is not state of the art, suggesting that additional gains are possible. Future
extensions of this work may combine noise generators with varying correlation lengths,
add additional interactions between noise and image (e.g. multiplicative interactions or
local deformations) or take into account local image information in the noise generation
process to further boost robustness across many types of image corruptions.
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Appendix
A Architectures of the noise generators
The architectures of the noise generators are displayed in Tables 6 6 and 7. The number
of color channels is indicated by C. The noise generator displayed in Table 6 only uses
kernels with a size of 1 and thus produces spatially uncorrelated noise. With the stride
being 1 and no padding, the spatial dimensions are preserved in each layer. The noise
generator displayed in Table 7 has one layer with 3x3 convolutions and thus produces
noise samples with a correlation length of 3x3 pixels.
Layer Shape
Conv + ReLU 20× 1× 1
Conv + ReLU 20× 1× 1
Conv + ReLU 20× 1× 1
Conv C ×1× 1
Layer Shape
Conv + ReLU 20× 1× 1
Conv + ReLU 20× 3× 3
Conv + ReLU 20× 1× 1
Conv C ×1× 1
Table 7: Architecture of the noise
generator producing locally corre-
lated noise.
B Implementation details and hyper-parameters
Preprocessing MNIST images are preprocessed such that their pixel values lie in the
range [0, 1]. Preprocessing for ImageNet is performed in the standard way for PyTorch
ImageNet models from the model zoo by subtracting the mean [0.485, 0.456, 0.406] and
dividing by the standard deviation [0.229, 0.224, 0.225]. We add Gaussian, adversarial and
Speckle noise before the preprocessing step, so the noisy images are first clipped to the
range [0, 1] of the raw images and then preprocessed before being fed into the model.
B.1 ImageNet experiments
For all ImageNet experiments, we used a pretrained ResNet50 architecture from https://
pytorch.org/docs/stable/torchvision/models.html. We fine-tuned the model with
SGD-M using an initial learning rate of 0.001, which corresponds to the last learning rate
of the PyTorch model training, and a momentum of 0.9. After convergence, we decayed
the learning rate once by a factor of 10 and continued the training. Decaying the learning
rate was highly beneficial for the model performance. We tried decaying the learning
rate a second time, but this did not bring any benefits in any of our experiments. For
GNT, we also tried training from scratch, i.e. starting with a large learning rate of 0.1
and random weights, and trained for 120 epochs, but we got worse results compared to
merely fine-tuning the model provided by torchvision. We used a batch size of 70 for all
our experiments. We have also tried to use the batch sizes 50 and 100, but did not see
major effects.
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Gaussian noise We trained the models until convergence. The total number of training
epochs varied between 30 and 90 epochs.
Speckle noise We used the Speckle noise implementation from https://github.com/
hendrycks/robustness/blob/master/ImageNet-C/create_c/make_imagenet_c.py, line
270. The model trained with Speckle noise converged faster than with Gaussian data
augmentation and therefore, we only trained the model for 10 epochs.
Adversarial Noise Training The adversarial noise generator was trained with the
Adam optimizer with a learning rate of 0.0001. We have replaced the noise generator
every 0.33 epochs. For ANT1x1, we set the -sphere to control the size of the perturbation
to 135.0 which on average corresponds to the `2-size of a perturbation caused by additive
Gaussian noise sampled from N (0, 0.52 ·1). We have trained the classifier until convergence
for 80 epochs. For ANT3x3, we set the -sphere to 70.0 and trained the classifier for 80
epochs. We decreased the -sphere for ANT3x3 to counteract giving the noise generator
more degrees of freedom to fool the classifier to maintain a similar training losses and
accuracies for ANT1x1 and ANT3x3.
B.2 MNIST experiments
For the MNIST experiments, we used the same model architecture as Madry et al. [2017]
for our ANT1x1 and GNT. For ANT1x1, our learning rate for the generator was between
10−4 and 10−5, and equal to 10−3 for the classifier. We used a batch size of 300. As an
optimizer, we used SGD-M with a momentum of 0.9 for the classifier and Adam [Kingma
and Ba, 2014] for the generator. The splitting of batches in clean, noisy and history was
equivalent to the ImageNet experiments. The optimal  hyper-parameter was determined
with a line search similar to the optimal σ of the Gaussian noise; we found  = 10 to
be optimal. The parameters for the Gaussian noise experiments were equivalent. Both
models were trained until convergence (around 500-600 epochs). GNT and ANT1x1 were
performed on a pretrained network.
C Detailed results on the evaluation of robustness due to regular
adversarial training
We find that standard adversarial training against minimal adversarial perturbations
in general does not increase robustness against common corruptions. While some early
results on CIFAR-10 by Ford et al. [2019] and Tiny ImageNet-C by Hendrycks and
Dietterich [2019] suggest that standard adversarial training might increase robustness to
common corruptions, we here observe the opposite: Adversarially trained models have
lower robustness against common corruptions. An adversarially trained ResNet152 with
an additional denoising layer10 from Xie et al. [2019b] has lower accuracy across almost
all corruptions except Snow and Pixelations. On some corruptions, the accuracy of the
adversarially trained model decreases drastically, e.g. from 49.1% to 4.6% on Fog or 42.8%
to 9.3% on Contrast. Similarly, the adversarially trained ResNet5011 from [Shafahi et al.,
10Model weights from https://github.com/facebookresearch/ImageNet-Adversarial-Training
11Model weights were kindly provided by the authors.
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2019] shows a substantial decrease in performance on common corruptions compared with
a vanilla trained model.
An evaluation of a robustified version of AlexNet11 [Shafahi et al., 2018] that was
trained with the Universal Adversarial Training scheme on ImageNet-C shows that
achieving robustness against universal adversarial perturbations does not noticeably
increase robustness towards common corruptions (22.2%) compared with a vanilla trained
model (21.1%).
Noise (Compressed) Blur (Compressed)
Model All Gaussian Shot Impulse Defocus Glass Motion Zoom
Vanilla RN50 39.2 29.3 27.0 23.8 38.7 26.8 38.7 36.2
AT [Shafahi et al., 2019] 29.1 20.5 19.1 12.4 21.4 30.8 30.4 31.4
Vanilla RN152 45.0 35.7 34.3 29.6 45.1 32.8 48.4 40.5
AT [Xie et al., 2019b] 35.0 35.2 34.4 24.8 22.1 31.7 30.9 32.0
Vanilla AlexNet 21.1 11.4 10.6 7.7 18.0 17.4 21.4 20.2
UAT [Shafahi et al., 2018] 22.2 20.1 19.1 16.2 13.1 21.6 19.7 19.2
Weather (Compressed) Digital (Compressed)
Model Snow Frost Fog Brightness Contrast Elastic Pixelate JPEG
Vanilla RN50 32.5 38.1 45.8 68.0 39.1 45.2 44.8 53.4
AT [Shafahi et al., 2019] 24.4 25.6 5.8 51.1 7.8 45.4 53.4 56.3
Vanilla RN152 38.7 43.9 49.1 71.2 42.8 51.1 50.5 60.5
AT [Xie et al., 2019b] 42.0 40.4 4.6 58.8 9.3 47.2 54.1 58.0
Vanilla AlexNet 13.3 17.3 18.1 43.5 14.7 35.4 28.2 39.4
UAT [Shafahi et al., 2018] 13.8 18.3 4.3 36.5 4.8 36.8 42.3 47.1
Table 8: Average Top-1 accuracy over 5 severities of common corruptions on ImageNet-C in
percent. A high accuracy on a certain corruption type indicates high robustness of a classifier
on this corruption type, so higher accuracy is better. Adversarial training (AT) decreases the
accuracy on common corruptions, especially on the corruptions Fog and Contrast. Universal
Adversarial Training (UAT) slightly increases the overall performance.
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D Detailed ImageNet-C results
We show detailed results on individual corruptions in Table 9 in accuracy and in Table 10
in mCE for differently trained models. In Fig. 5, we show the degradation of accuracy
for different severity levels. To avoid clutter, we only show results for a vanilla trained
model, for the previous state of the art SIN+IN [Geirhos et al., 2019], for several Gaussian
trained models and for the overall best model ANT3x3+SIN.
The Corruption Error [Hendrycks and Dietterich, 2019] is defined as
CEfc =
(
5∑
s=1
Efs,c
)/( 5∑
s=1
EAlexNets,c
)
, (5)
where Efs,c is the Top-1 error of a classifier f for a corruption c with severity s. The mean
Corruption error (mCE) is taken by averaging over all corruptions.
Noise Blur Weather Digital
model meanGaussShotImpulseDefocusGlassMotionZoomSnowFrostFogBrightContrastElasticPixelJpeg
Vanilla RN50 39 29 27 24 39 27 39 36 33 38 46 68 39 45 45 53
Shift Inv 42 36 34 30 40 29 38 39 33 40 48 68 42 45 49 57
Patch GN 44 45 43 42 38 26 39 38 30 39 54 67 39 52 47 56
SIN+IN 45 41 40 37 43 32 45 36 41 42 47 67 43 50 56 58
AugMix 48 41 41 38 48 35 54 49 40 44 47 69 51 52 57 60
Speckle 46 55 58 49 43 32 40 36 34 41 46 68 41 47 49 58
GNTmult 49 67 65 64 43 33 41 37 34 42 45 68 41 48 50 60
GNTσ0.5 49 58 59 57 47 38 43 42 35 44 44 68 39 50 55 62
GNTσ0.5+SIN 52 57 58 54 41 39 47 36 48 49 57 67 53 54 57 58
ANT1x1 51 65 66 64 47 37 43 40 36 46 44 70 43 49 55 62
ANT1x1+SIN 52 64 65 63 46 38 46 39 42 47 49 69 47 50 57 60
ANT1x1 w/o EP 49 59 59 57 46 37 43 40 34 43 43 68 39 49 55 61
ANT3x3 50 65 64 64 44 36 42 38 39 46 44 69 41 49 55 61
ANT3x3+SIN 53 62 61 60 41 39 46 37 48 52 55 68 49 53 59 59
Table 9: Average Top-1 accuracy over 5 severities of common corruptions on ImageNet-C
in percent obtained by different models; higher is better.
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Figure 5. Top-1 accuracy for each corruption type and severity on ImageNet-C.
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Noise Blur Weather Digital
model mCEGaussShotImpulseDefocusGlassMotionZoomSnowFrostFogBrightContrastElasticPixelJpeg
Vanilla 77 80 82 83 75 89 78 80 78 75 66 57 71 85 77 77
SIN 69 66 67 68 70 82 69 80 68 71 65 58 66 78 62 70
Patch GN 71 62 63 62 75 90 78 78 81 74 57 59 71 74 74 72
Shift Inv. 73 73 74 76 74 86 78 77 77 72 63 56 68 86 71 71
AugMix 65 67 66 68 64 79 59 64 69 68 65 54 57 74 60 65
Speckle 68 51 47 55 70 83 77 80 76 71 66 57 70 82 71 69
GNTmult 65 37 39 39 69 81 76 79 76 70 67 56 69 81 69 66
GNTσ0.5 64 46 46 47 65 75 72 74 75 68 69 57 71 78 63 63
ANT1x1 62 39 38 39 65 77 72 75 74 66 68 53 67 78 62 62
ANT1x1+SIN 61 40 39 40 65 76 69 76 67 64 62 55 63 77 59 66
ANT1x1 w/o EP 65 46 46 47 66 76 73 75 76 69 70 57 72 79 63 64
ANT3x3 63 39 40 39 68 78 73 77 71 66 68 55 69 79 63 64
ANT3x3+SIN 61 43 44 43 71 74 69 79 60 58 55 56 59 73 57 67
Table 10: Average mean Corruption Error (mCE) obtained by different models on common
corruptions from ImageNet-C; lower is better.
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Figure 6. Average accuracy on MNIST-C over all severties and corruptions for
different values of sigma σ of the Gaussian noise training (GNT) during training.
Each point corresponds to one converged training.
E MNIST-C results
Similar to the ImageNet-C experiments, we are interested how vanilla, adversarially and
noise trained models perform on MNIST-C.
The adversarially robust MNIST model by Wong et al. [2018] was trained with a
robust loss function and is among the state of the art in certified adversarial robustness.
The other baseline models were trained with Adversarial Training in `2 (DDN) by Rony
et al. [2019] and `∞ (PGD) by Madry et al. [2017]. Our GNT and ANT1x1 trained versions
are trained as described in the main paper and Appendix B.2. The results are shown
in Table 11. Similar to ImageNet-C, the models trained with GNT and ANT1x1 are
significantly better than our vanilla trained baseline. Also, regular adversarial training
has severe drops and does not lead to significant robustness improvements.
As for ImageNet and GNT, we have treated σ as a hyper-parameter. The accuracy
on MNIST-C for different values of σ is displayed in Fig. 6 and has a maximum around
σ = 0.5 like for ImageNet.
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Vanilla 99.1 86.9 98 96 96 94 98 95 92 88 57 88 50 97 96 86 72
[Madry et al., 2017] 98.5 75.6 98 55 94 94 97 88 92 27 53 40 63 96 78 74 84
Vanilla 98.8 74.3 98 91 96 88 95 80 89 34 45 41 23 96 96 80 63
[Wong et al., 2018] 98.2 68.6 97 65 93 93 94 87 89 11 40 20 25 96 89 61 68
Vanilla 99.5 89.8 98 96 95 97 98 96 94 95 61 89 79 98 98 90 63
DDN Tr [Rony et al., 2019] 99.0 87.0 99 97 96 94 98 91 93 72 55 92 64 99 98 91 66
Vanilla 99.1 86.9 98 96 96 94 98 95 92 88 57 88 50 97 96 86 72
GNTσ0.5 99.3 92.4 99 99 98 97 98 95 93 98 56 91 91 99 99 96 78
ANT1x1 99.4 92.4 99 99 98 97 98 95 93 98 55 89 91 99 99 96 80
Table 11: Accuracy in percent for the MNIST-C dataset for adversarially robust ([Wong
et al., 2018], [Madry et al., 2017], DDN [Rony et al., 2019]) and our noise trained models
(GNT and ANT1x1). Vanilla always denotes the same network architecture as its adversarially
or noise trained counterpart but with standard training. Note that we used the same network
architecture as Madry et al. [2017].
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F Evaluation of adversarial robustness of models trained via GNT
and ANT1x1
ImageNet To evaluate adversarial robustness on ImageNet, we used PGD [Madry et al.,
2017] and DDN [Rony et al., 2019]. For the `∞ PGD attack, we allowed for 200 iterations
with a step size of 0.0001 and a maximum sphere size of 0.001. For the DDN `2 attack,
we also allowed for 200 iterations, set the sphere adjustment parameter γ to 0.02 and
the maximum epsilon to 0.125. We note that for both attacks increasing the number of
iterations from 100 to 200 did not make a significant difference in robustness of our tested
models. The results on adversarial robustness on ImageNet can be found in the main
paper in Table 5.
MNIST To evaluate adversarial robustness on MNIST, we also used PGD [Madry et al.,
2017] and DDN [Rony et al., 2019]. For the `∞ PGD attack, we allowed for 100 iterations
with a step size of 0.01 and a maximum sphere size of 0.1. For the DDN `2 attack, we
also allowed for 100 iterations, set the sphere adjustment parameter γ to 0.05 and the
maximum epsilon to 1.5. All models have the same architecture as Madry et al. [2017].
The results on adversarial robustness on MNIST can be found in Table 12.
model clean acc. [%] `2 acc. [%] `∞ acc. [%]
Vanilla 99.1 73.2 55.8
GNTσ0.5 99.3 89.2 73.6
ANT1x1 99.4 90.4 76.3
Table 12: Adversarial robustness on MNIST on `2 ( = 1.5) and `∞ ( = 0.1) compared to
a Vanilla CNN.
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Figure 7. Example images with different σ-levels of additive Gaussian noise on
ImageNet.
G Example images for additive Gaussian noise
Example images with additive Gaussian noise of varying standard deviation σ are displayed
in Fig. 7. The considered σ-levels correspond to those studied in section 4.2. in the main
paper.
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H Comparison to Ford et al.
Ford et al. trained an InceptionV3 model from scratch both on clean data from the
ImageNet dataset and on data augmented with Gaussian noise [Ford et al., 2019]. Since
we use a very similar approach, we compare our approach to theirs directly. The results
for comparison on ImageNet both for the vanilla and the Gaussian noise trained model can
be found in Table 13. Since we use a pretrained model provided by PyTorch and fine-tune
it instead of training a new one, the performance of our vanilla trained model differs from
the performance of their vanilla trained model, both on clean data and on ImageNet-C.
The accuracy on clean data is displayed in Table 14. Another difference between our
training and theirs is that we split every batch evenly in clean and data augmented by
Gaussian noise with one standard deviation whereas they sample σ uniformly between 0
and one specific value. With our training scheme, we were able to outperform their model
significantly on all corruptions except for Elastic, Fog and Brightness.
Noise (Compressed) Blur (Compressed)
model All Gaussian Shot Impulse Defocus Glass Motion Zoom
Vanilla InceptionV3 [Ford et al., 2019] 38.8 36.6 34.3 34.7 31.1 19.3 35.3 30.1
Gaussian (σ = 0.4) [Ford et al., 2019] 42.7 40.3 38.8 37.7 32.9 29.8 35.3 33.1
Vanilla InceptionV3 [ours] 41.6 42.0 40.3 38.5 33.5 27.1 36.1 28.8
GNTσ0.4 [ours] 49.5 60.8 59.6 59.4 43.8 37.0 42.8 38.4
GNTσ0.5 [ours] 50.2 61.6 60.9 60.8 44.6 37.3 44.0 39.3
Weather (Compressed) Digital (Compressed)
model Snow Frost Fog Brightness Contrast Elastic Pixelate JPEG
Vanilla InceptionV3 [Ford et al., 2019] 33.1 34.0 52.4 66.0 35.9 47.8 38.2 50.0
Gaussian (σ = 0.4) [Ford et al., 2019] 36.6 43.5 52.3 67.1 35.8 52.2 47.0 55.5
Vanilla InceptionV3 [ours] 33.5 39.6 42.2 64.2 41.0 43.5 57.4 56.9
GNTσ0.4 [ours] 35.6 43.7 43.3 64.8 43.0 49.0 59.3 61.7
GNTσ0.5 [ours] 37.1 44.2 43.6 64.6 43.3 49.4 59.6 61.9
Table 13: ImageNet-C accuracy for InceptionV3.
model clean accuracy [%]
Vanilla InceptionV3 [Ford et al., 2019] 75.9
Gaussian (σ = 0.4) [Ford et al., 2019] 74.2
Vanilla InceptionV3 [ours] 77.2
GNTσ0.4 [ours] 78.1
GNTσ0.5 [ours] 77.9
Table 14: Accuracy on clean data for differently trained models.
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I Visualization of images with different perturbation sizes
In the main paper, we measure model robustness by calculating the median perturbation
size ∗ and report the results in Table 3. To provide a better intuition for the noise level
in an image for a particular ∗, we display example images in Fig. 8.
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Figure 8. Example images for the different perturbation sizes ∗ and different noise
types on ImageNet corresponding to the ∗ values in Table 3 in the main paper.
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Clean JPEG Posterize
Figure 9. Example images for the JPEG compression from ImageNet-C and the
PIL.ImageOps.Posterize operation.
IN IN-C IN-C w/o noises
model clean acc. Top-1 Top-5 Top-1 Top-5
Vanilla RN50 76.1 39.2 59.3 42.3 63.2
ANT1x1 RN50 76.0 (51.1) (72.2) 47.7 68.8
Vanilla DN121 74.4 42.1 63.4 44.0 65.5
ANT1x1 DN121 74.3 50.3 71.6 46.8 68.3
Table 15: Average accuracy on clean data, average Top-1 and Top-5 accuracies on full
ImageNet-C and ImageNet-C without the noise category (higher is better); all values in
percent. We compare the results obtained by ANT1x1 for a ResNet50 (RN50) architecture
to a DenseNet121 (DN121) architecture.
J Visualization of Posterize vs JPEG
AugMix [Hendrycks et al., 2020] uses Posterize as one of their operations for data
augmentation during training. In Fig. 9, we show the visual similarity between the
Posterize operation and the JPEG corruption from ImageNet-C.
K Additional results
K.1 Adversarial Noise Training with a DenseNet121 architecture
To test in how far our results generalize to other backbones, we have trained a DenseNet121
model with ANT1x1. The DenseNet121 model was finetuned from the checkpoint provided
by torchvision. A DenseNet121 has 7.97886 · 106 trainable parameters whereas a ResNet50
has 2.5557 ·107. Our results and a comparison to ANT1x1 with a ResNet50 model is shown
in Table 15: ANT1x1 increases robustness on full ImageNet-C and ImageNet-C without
noises for the DenseNet121 model, showing that adversarial noise training generalizes to
other backbones.
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Number of IN IN-C IN-C w/o noises
model parameters clean acc. Top-1 Top-1
Vanilla RN50 - 76.1 39.2 42.3
ANT1x1 RN50 NG1 12 75.1 (49.5) 46.6
ANT1x1 RN50 NG2 143 75.5 (50.8) 47.2
ANT1x1 RN50 NG3 563 75.3 (50.7) 47.2
ANT1x1 RN50 NG4 983 76.0 (51.1) 47.7
ANT1x1 RN50 NG5 1403 74.0 (50.7) 47.0
Table 16: Number of trainable parameters of different noise generators, average accuracy
on clean data, ImageNet-C and ImageNet-C without the noise category (higher is better);
all values in percent. We compare the results obtained by ANT1x1 with noise generators
of different depth. Note that a depth of 4 layers was used in all experiments in this paper
apart from this ablation study.
K.2 Results for different parameter counts of the noise generator
Here, we study the effect of different parameter counts of the adversarial noise generator
on ANT1x1. We provide the results in Table 16. We indicate the depth of the noise
generator with a subscript. All experiments in this paper apart from this ablation study
were performed with a default depth of 4 layers. We observe that while depth is a
tunable hyper-parameter, the performances of ANT1x1 with the studied noise generators
do not differ by a lot. Only the most shallow noise generator with a depth of one layer
and only 12 trainable parameters results in a roughly 1% lower accuracy than its deeper
counterparts. We note that a GNTσ0.5 model has an accuracy of 49.4% on full ImageNet-C
and an accuracy of 47.1% on ImageNet-C without noises which roughly corresponds to
the respective accuracies of ANT1x1 with the most shallow noise generator.
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